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I. INTRODUCTION
It is unchanging black letter law that a contract of insurance is a
transfer of risk. This system, which funds the transfer of risk, oper-
ates through an application of the law of large numbers. The trans-
ferred risk, or "peril," will produce a loss to some individuals in a large
group. While each individual cannot predict if he will suffer the peril,
it can be stated statistically that the peril will strike some individuals
in the group. The insurer collects premiums from the group and pools
them to cover these losses and the operating costs of the insurer. The
risk-neutral individual, who does not know whether or not the risk
will materialize, pays a small amount for protection against the small
chance that it will materialize. These individuals fund the operation
of a system that achieves a social good in an effective and efficient
manner. '
The perfect operation of the system can be thwarted by free riders
in two ways. First, when individuals who have chosen not to partici-
pate in the group attempt to transfer risk for a loss that already has
occurred, the prevalence of the risk is altered in the group. In an in-
surance context, this can occur when a proposed insured conceals a
condition and then claims benefits for that condition. The risk-neutral
individuals who "play by the rules" end up participating in a system
with an artificially high concentration of the risk and facing higher
than necessary payments to fund the losses of free riders, who do not
participate in the cost of the system, but reap the benefit of the sys-
tem.2 Second, the system also is defeated to the extent that legitimate
losses are not indemnified.
Historically, courts and legislatures have focused on the second
concern more than the first. Through "incontestability" clauses, the
insurer's ability to challenge the validity of the contract has been leg-
islatively limited in time or scope. As insurance fraud has become
more prevalent, however, these clauses have been increasingly used
by opportunists as a safe harbor for fraud. Judicial doctrines have
attempted to find solutions that balance the desire to protect innocent
insureds with the desire to avoid encouraging insurance fraud.
One of those doctrines is the so-called "first manifest" doctrine.
This doctrine uses policy language to avoid incontestability facilitated
fraud by allowing coverage, but limits the risks transferred to those
1. "Insurance law promotes efficiency whenever it is structured to help reduce the
sum of the costs of insurance and loss prevention." KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, Dis-
ThaBUTING RISK 11 (1986).
2. The system becomes economically inefficient in that the cost of insurance is in-
creased by the artificially high incidence of risk in the group. Further, to the
extent that loss prevention reduces the occurrence of the risk in the group, indi-
viduals who introduce a loss that already has occurred frustrate the ability of loss
prevention to reduce the frequency of occurrence.
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intended by the contract. The doctrine allows the insurer to deny a
specific claim for a concealed condition while allowing the insured to
keep coverage under the policy in effect for any condition that was
unknown to the applicant.
This Article discusses a recent leading case in the area, Paul Re-
vere Life Insurance Co. v. Haas.3 Haas represents an example of a
state supreme court making new law to achieve policy objectives.
Analysis of Haas and similar cases in other jurisdictions suggests that
the relevant policy factors behind both incontestability and exceptions
to incontestability can be described in equation form. A review of his-
torical trends suggests that those variables leading to legislative rec-
ognition of incontestability have been supplanted by other factors. In
contrast, those variables leading to judicial exceptions to incontest-
ability, including insurance fraud, have become more prominent. This
perspective suggests that recent first manifest cases represent a judi-
cial balancing of an equation thrown out of balance by rising insur-
ance fraud. Finally, the economic perspective suggests that the
doctrine is ,a more efficient way to achieve multiple policy goals than
the legislative alternative available in some states.
II. THE HAAS DECISION
Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Haas dealt with several themes that
will be common in first manifest cases:
* historical policy concerns, which led to the incontestability clause,
namely a belief that insurers used unequal power to overreach as
against innocent insureds;
* modern policy concerns recognizing the ease and prevalence of
fraud;
* the effect of any election between alternate clauses allowed by the
relevant incontestability statute; and
* the interaction between incontestability clauses and contract provi-
sions dealing with preexisting conditions.
In Haas, the insurer sought a declaration that a policy issued to an
insured was void or in the alternative that the policy provided no cov-
erage for a condition concealed on the application. A trial court
granted the insured's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
insured's policy was incontestable. The insurer appealed.4
In this procedural posture, the appeals court therefore viewed all
disputed facts in a light most favorable to the insurer. Under this
standard, the court assumed that Haas knew he had suffered from a
3. 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. 1994), revog in part, 628 A.2d 772 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993).
4. 628 A.2d 772, 773 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
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four-year history of retinitis pigmentosa, a degenerative condition
that can lead to blindness. He neither disclosed this fact nor revealed
treatment received for the condition when he applied for disability
coverage with the insurer. Two years and nine months after issuance
of the policy, Haas claimed that he had become totally disabled from
retinitis pigmentosa and therefore was entitled to be paid under the
policy.5
The policy issued to Haas had statutorily mandated incontestabil-
ity language, which stated as follows:
10.2 INCONTESTABLE
a. After Your Policy has been in force for two years, excluding any time You
are disabled, We cannot contest the statements in the application. b. No claim
for loss incurred or disability beginning after two years from the Date of Issue
will be reduced or denied because a disease or physical condition existed
before the Date of Issue unless it is excluded by name or specific description.6
This version of the incontestability clause was one of two alternate
versions required by section 17B:26-5 of the New Jersey statutes. The
second alternative would have provided that
[a]fter 2 years from the date of issue of this policy no misstatements, except
fraudulent misstatements, made by the applicant in the application for such
policy shall be used to void the policy or to deny a claim for loss incurred or
disability (as defined in the policy) commencing after the expiration of such 2-
year period. 7
The appeals court found that the election to use the first version of
the clause was fatal to the attempt to void the policy, even if Haas
acted with fraudulent intent. "We would contravene the clear mean-
ing of the policy, and indeed the statute, were we to graft the 'except
fraudulent misrepresentations' phrase upon the clause pertinent
here."s
The policy, however, also contained language that required the dis-
ability to be caused by a sickness that "first manifests itself after the
Date of Issue and while Your Policy is in force."9 The policy also indi-
cated that it would not pay benefits for "a Pre-existing Condition if it
was not disclosed on Your application."10 This led to an argument
that even if the policy was valid, the condition was not covered. Under
this argument, the incontestability clause did not bar diseases that
had not only existed, but had manifested in illness known to the in-
sured. Alternately, the exclusion for preexisting conditions could be
5. Id. at 773-74.
6. Id. at 773.
7. N.J. REv. STAT. § 17B:26-5(a) (1985).
8. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 628 A.2d 772, 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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viewed as meaning that the disease was "excluded by ... specific
description."' 1
The appeals court rejected these arguments on several grounds.
First, the court held that the insurer's position would frustrate the
"reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who
buys it."12 Second, the court viewed the contract as a contract of adhe-
sion and resolved any ambiguity as to whether the condition was ex-
cluded by specific description against the insurer.13 Third, the court
felt that the proposed rule "frustrates the underlying purpose of the
incontestability clause," namely to limit litigation and to allow the in-
sured a sense of security after the contestability period.14
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appeals court deci-
sion and overruled prior New Jersey law in doing so.15 Although the
court evaluated the case based on contract language, it recognized
that policy concerns were involved as well. 'ltimately... it involves
a policy choice concerning the effect of an insured's concealment of a
disability in an application for insurance on a subsequent claim for the
concealed disability."16
The court initially discussed the historical policy justification for
the clause. Unlike the historical conclusion that insurance fraud was
only a "minuscule"17 problem, however, the court also noted that
"[i]nsurance fraud is a problem of massive proportions that currently
results in substantial and unnecessary costs to the general public in
the form of increased rates."1 Further, the court noted that the legis-
11. Id.
12. Id. at 776 (quoting Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 30 (N.J.
1961)). Logically, this argument is valid only to the extent that the "average
member of the public" expects that he may conceal an existing illness and obtain
coverage for that illness.
13. Id. at 775. The appeals court also relied on a prior New Jersey appeals court case
that had rejected this very argument. See Lindsay v. United States Life Ins. Co.,
194 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1963).
14. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 628 A.2d 772, 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993). The appeals court decision was remarkably similar to a decision by a
Pennsylvania federal district court applying New Jersey law in January 1993. In
Manzella v. Indianapolis Life Insurance Co., 814 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Penn. 1993),
the court rejected a first manifest argument on the grounds that the insurer had
elected not to use the version of the clause allowing a challenge for fraudulent
misrepresentations. Id. at 432. The court also rejected the argument that the
exclusion of preexisting conditions operated as an exclusion by specific descrip-
tion. Id. at 433-34.
15. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. 1994).
16. Id. at 1101.
17. Id. at 1102 (quoting 1A JoHN ALAN APPLENLA & JEAN APPLEmAN, INsUrnACE LAW
AND PRACTICE WrH Foymis 305 (1981)).
18. Id. at 1107 (quoting Merin v. Maglaki, 599 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.J. 1992)). Merin v.
Maglaki acknowledged that "approximately 10 to 15 percent of all insurance
claims involve fraud." 599 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.J. 1992).
1997]
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lature recently had passed new insurance fraud legislation designed
to "confront aggressively the problem of insurance fraud in New
Jersey by facilitating the detection of insurance fraud... and reduc-
ing the amount of premium dollars used to pay fraudulent claims."' 9
With these concerns, the court harmonized the various policy provi-
sions by allowing the policy to remain in force, but limiting its cover-
age so as to exclude known conditions concealed on the application.
To do so, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused again on the in-
contestability clause in the contract. First, the court rejected the ar-
gument that the clause must be construed against the insurer.
Provision 10.2b ... is not the result of the insurer's dominant bargaining
power. Rather, it results from the statutory mandate of N.J.S.A. 17B:26-5b,
which requires the inclusion of the provision in a disability policy.
"A specific provision integrated into the contract by the force of a statute,
as a matter of public policy, 'must be interpreted and given effect in accord-
ance with the intention of the legislature .... .-
... We doubt that the Legislature, when enacting N.J.S.A. 17B:26-5b, con-
templated that it was authorizing insureds to conceal a known disability and
then reap the benefit of their deception by recovering for the disability that
was so concealed.
2 0
Turning to the language of the clause, the court noted that the con-
tract provided no coverage for conditions "excluded by name or specific
description."21 Since the definition of sickness included only condi-
tions that had manifested after the date of issue, the court held condi-
tions known to, but concealed by, the insured were "exclu[ded] by
specific description" as described in the incontestable clause. 22 "Be-
cause Haas concealed that he suffered from retinitis pigmentosa, Paul
Revere could hardly be expected to exclude 'that disease or physical
condition' by a more specific description."23
The court distinguished between conditions that existed but were
unknown to the insured and conditions that both had existed and
manifested themselves to the insured. Balancing the concern that an
innocent insured could be pulled within the ambit of the court's deci-
sion, the court held that the defense could be used only when the in-
sured was aware of a condition. "[W]hen a condition existed, but was
not manifest, the insurer may not use it as a defense; but when the
19. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1107-08 (N.J. 1994)(quoting
N.J. REv. STAT. § 17:33A-2 (1985)).
20. Id. at 1106-07 (quoting Saffore v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 121 A.2d 543, 548 (N.J.
1956)(quoting 3 CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 551, at 200-01 (1960))). Using
common sense, the Haas court also recognized that "[tihe premium would be
vastly different if the insured could deceive the insurer into insuring against
risks that had already arisen." Id. at 1107.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1105. The decision overruled Lindsay v. United States Life Insurance Co.,
194 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968), as wrongly decided on this point.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1106 (N.J. 1994).
23. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1105 (N.J. 1994).
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condition was known to the insured, the insurer may deny
coverage."2 4
The court reinforced the explicit policy considerations behind this
interpretation by stating that "[wie believe that insurers should com-
pensate victims to the extent 'that compensation will not condone and
encourage intentionally wrongful conduct.'"2 5
Two dissenters harkened back to the historical policy considera-
tions behind incontestability and would have rejected the first mani-
fest defense.
[W]hat of the next policyholder who, not having known that she had cancer at
the time she purchased her health insurance despite having felt a lump in her
breast, must face costly and lengthy litigation brought by her insurance com-
pany, which claims she concealed her cancer?... The only reason we have
incontestability clauses in insurance policies is because of widespread
"charges of corruption, fraud and dishonesty" in the insurance industry.2 6
The dissenters also felt that the insurer had made a "marketing"
decision not to use the alternate clause, which would have allowed the
policy to be contested on the basis of fraud.2 7 This argument ignores
that the insured's policy was not being contested and remained in
force for any other conditions that had not manifested prior to
issuance.
The rule in Haas prevents either party to the transaction from tak-
ing undue advantage of the other. The insurer is not required to in-
demnify for illnesses that were concealed by the insured. The policy
remains in force, however, for other conditions unknown to the in-
sured. Thus, the insured who conceals a back condition, but becomes
disabled from a heart attack, retains coverage. The risk of these un-
foreseen losses is spread through the insurance system. Risk of a loss
that has already transpired, however, remains with the insured.
Understanding the rule in Haas requires an understanding of the
historical roots of incontestability, as well as the current massive in-
crease in insurance fraud. The next section addresses the historical
aspects of incontestability.
A. The Roots of Incontestability
The first known incontestability clause was introduced as a mar-
keting technique in 1848 by an insurer with the unlikely name of In-
disputable Life Insurance Company.28 The clause is believed to have
24. Id. at 1107.
25. Id. (quoting Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1263 (N.J.
1992)).
26. Id. at 1109 (O'Hern, J., dissenting)(quoting Eric Y. Fosaaen, Note, AIDS and the
Incontestability Clause, 66 N.D. L. REv. 267, 269 (1990)).
27. Id. at 1110.
28. 1 BERTRAMi HARNHTT & IRVING L. LEssNicu, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HF.ALTH INsun-
ANcE § 507131, at 5-207 (1997).
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been introduced to reduce buyer resistance after a series of cases rely-
ing on breach of warranty as a defense. 29 Notably, the early policies
excepted fraud from the operation of the clause.30
Early American experience essentially mirrored the English expe-
rience, with claims resisted on the basis of breach of warranty. "Many
resisted claims with such intensity that public receptivity to life insur-
ance was further abated."31 By the turn of the century, the clause was
relatively well established in American life insurance policies.
The voluntary introduction of the clause did not end complaints
regarding insurance practices. "Common abuses by life insurance
companies included the refusal to pay death benefits or offers of settle-
ment of substantially less than the policy value because of often minormisrepresentations in the application."32 These issues led to reform
commissions and hearings in several states, the most notable being
the Armstrong Commission in New York and the "Committee of Fif-
teen" in Chicago. Both groups developed standard policy language,
including a standard incontestability clause, which was rapidly
adopted by a number of states.33
Most sources relate the policy behind incontestability statutes to
these early complaints.
The explanation lies in the early greed and ruthlessness of the insurers. All
too often, instead of paying the beneficiary, they resisted liability stubbornly
on the basis of some misstatement made by the insured at the time of apply-
ing for the policy, as to which they carefully refrained from comment until the
insured had died and was unable to testify in his own behalf ... (S]uch cases
... create[d] the impression on the public mind that a contract of life insur-
ance was a one-sided affair, and was simply a scheme on the part of designing
individuals and corporations to secure to themselves to the earnings of
others. 34
Early decisions construed the statutorily mandated clause quite
strictly, holding that an incontestability clause cut off all defenses ex-
cept for those specifically mentioned in the clause.3 5 Other cases held
that the clause functioned as a statute of repose without exceptions.36
29. Id.
30. Id. The earliest American legislation regarding incontestability also excepted
fraud. Section 5779 of the Ohio statutes estopped insurers from "defending, upon
any ground other than fraud... errors, omissions, or misstatements of the as-
sured, in any application." See Eric K. Fosaaen, Note, AIDS and the Incontest-
ability Clause, 66 N.D. L. REv. 267, 268 n.13 (1990)(citing OHIO REv. STAT. OF
1880, § 5779 (Laning 1907)).
31. Fosaaen, supra note 30, at 269.
32. Id. at 268 n.10.
33. Id. at 269.
34. 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRAcTs 394-95 (Walter H.E.
Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1963).
35. See, e.g., Plotner v. Northwestern Natl Life Ins. Co., 183 N.W. 1000 (N.D. 1921).
36. See, e.g., Wright v. Mutual Ben. Life Ass'n of Am., 23 N.E. 186, 187 (N.Y. 1890).
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In response to the strict construction of the statute, a widely cited
1930 New York decision by Justice Cardozo began to open the inter-
pretation of the incontestability clause. In Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Conway,3 7 the insurer sought to place a rider in all of the
life insurance policies it issued excluding loss due to air travel other
than as a paying passenger. The Superintendent of the New York De-
partment of Insurance refused to allow the rider because in his opin-
ion it was inconsistent with the incontestability clause of New York's
insurance law.38 Justice Cardozo disagreed.
The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force
during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years is not a... defini-
tion of the hazards to be borne by the insurer. It means only this, that within
the limits of the coverage the policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense
that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by reason of a
condition broken.... The kind of insurance one has at the beginning, that,
but no more, one retains until the end.3 9
In 1947, the life insurance industry drafted model legislation codi-
fying the Conway decision. The model statute, drafted by a group
known as the Holland Committee, stated that
[a] clause in any policy of life insurance providing that such policy shall be
incontestable after a specified period shall preclude only a contest of the valid-
ity of the policy, and shall not preclude the assertion at any time of defenses
based upon provisions in the policy which exclude or restrict coverage,
whether or not such restrictions or exclusions are excepted in such clause.4 0
In spite of this trend, cases in some jurisdictions continued to en-
force the clause strictly.41 From this brief history, cycles can be seen
in which the incontestability has been absent, then strictly applied,
then more narrowly applied, then strictly applied in some jurisdic-
tions, and liberalized in others.
The Haas court explicitly discussed the rise in insurance fraud as a
policy concern supporting a departure from earlier law in New Jersey.
An economic perspective would predict that variations in the cycle are
due to courts adjusting the rule of law to seek economic efficiency. The
next section turns to that analysis.
B. An Economic Analysis of the Rule in Haas
The perfect function of the insurance system assumes two basic
rules-that only risks within the contemplation of the parties are
transferred, and that when these risks are transferred, individuals
37. 169 N.E. 642 (N.Y. 1930).
38. Id. at 642 (stating that the superintendent of insurance referred to N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 101, subd. 2.)
39. Id. at 642-43.
40. Fosaaen, supra note 30, at 276. The footnote collects citations to 27 states that
have enacted some form of the Holland Committee statute. Id. at 276 n.67.
41. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. New York Life Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 824 (D.N.J. 1980).
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who incur the covered peril are compensated. In theory, this is a zero-
sum system. Comparing only investment and payoff, an individual
who transfers a risk but who does not suffer the peril has a small neg-
ative payoff. An individual who transfers the risk and suffers the peril
has a large gain. On the other side of the balance sheet, the individual
who incurs the peril has his large gain nullified by the economic im-
pact of the peril. The individual who does not incur the peril has this
cost offset by the benefit of knowing that the peril will have no impact.
The insurer acts merely to administer the transfer of risk by setting
the cost of participating in the system and delivering indemnity to
those who suffer the peril. The advantage of this system is that the
negative consequences of the peril are eliminated at an overall cost of
zero to society.
Yet, any zero-sum system is vulnerable to manipulation by individ-
ual participants. Our "hypothetical" system assumes that risk-neu-
tral individuals have transferred a risk of a future contingency. Free
riders, in this case those who transfer the risk of a loss that already
has happened or is substantially certain to happen, do not participate
in the system unless and until it is to their advantage. Similarly, a
hypothetical insurer who fails to indemnify for valid losses receives a
free ride by artificially decreasing the incidence of risk in the pool and
externalizing the cost of maintaining the insurance system to others.
From a law and economics perspective, theory would predict that
concerns of economic efficiency and pareto-optimality4 2 are either im-
plicit or explicit in formulating the rule of law applied to specific cases
before a court. This theory can be demonstrated by an analysis of pol-
icy factors in incontestability, and how the doctrine has changed over
time in response to changes in the strength of individual variables to
the equation.
One commonly quoted source lists the main historical policy rea-
sons favoring incontestability:
[An applicant... may be guilty of outrageous fraud.... On the other hand,
only a minuscule percentage of the population ever resorts to such devious
conduct, and it is considered desirable to have a cutoff time as to ordinary
misrepresentations for two reasons: first, to lighten the burden upon the
courts, since litigation could otherwise be increased manyfold; second, since
most contests would arise after an insured's death, a beneficiary is in a
deplorable condition to wage battle with a large insurer over statements
which may have been made years earlier. For these reasons, it is better to
countenance an occasional fraud in order to bring an end to controversy.4 3
42. Pareto optimality is a definition of efficiency in which "an allocation of resources
is efficient if no one could be made better off by a reallocation without someone
else's being made worse off." ABRamAM, supra note 1, at 10.
43. IA JOHN ALAN APPLEmAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE WrrIH
FoRms § 311, at 305-06 (1981).
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Professor Appleman's analysis can be viewed as the framework for an
equation. We can describe the analysis as TCL + (C(A x Aw) > (C(F x
F(F) TC, where
TCaj (Transactional Cost of litigation) + (Ca (Evidentiary Cost of Absence of
Insured and/or passage of time) xAW (relatively lower ability of beneficiary to
successfully present evidence of true state of affairs to court)) > Co (Cost of
Fraud) x F0 (Frequency of Fraud).
Under Appleman's analysis, the cost of T() + (C(A x Aa)) is greater
than the cost (CF) x F(). Therefore, the judicial system, seeking eco-
nomic efficiency, takes steps to define a rule of law that tolerates (CO
x FO,) in order to reduce TC) + (C(A x Am). A strict interpretation of
incontestability reduces CA by setting a limit of two to three years in
which any misrepresentation can be challenged. This also reduces CA
and moots Aa) by cutting off the insurer's ability to present evidence as
to the true state of affairs in some circumstances. Where proof of
fraudulent misrepresentation after the contestable period is allowed,
C(AM is still decreased. This is because the bar is raised for the insurer,
who has the higher burden of proof of demonstrating fraud, as opposed
to material misrepresentation. Systemically, TC) is lowered through
a reduction in the number of cases litigated.
Other authorities state policy concerns in even more detail. The
reasons that have been given for the use and mandate of incontestabil-
ity clauses include the following:
- to provide insureds with a sense of security or assurance of
payment;
" to prevent excessive litigation;
" to protect the consumer from the "power discrepancy" between large
insurers and individual insureds;
" to provide for an investigation period followed by a period of repose;
" to prompt insurers to investigate (and discover fraud) sooner rather
than later;
* to encourage consumer confidence and create a climate that encour-
ages people to provide for their own financial security;
" to gain a competitive marketing advantage; and
* to protect insureds from the consequences of an unintentional
misrepresentation 44
This comprehensive list of policy concerns can be used to refine the
Appleman analysis even further, to TCQ) + C(o) + Cas) + (C(A) X Aa)) >
(CM x (Fo - ED(j)), where
TCaj (Transactional Cost of litigation) + Co) (Cost of Insurer Overreaching) +
Cas) (Cost of Loss of Security Felt by Insured) + (CO (Evidentiary Cost of Ab-
sence of Insured and/or passage of time) x A(D (relatively lower ability of bene-
ficiary to successfully present evidence of true state of affairs to court)) > Co
44. Robert R. Googins, Fraud and the Incontestable Clause: A Modest Proposal for
Change, 2 CoNN. INs. L.J. 51, 68 (1996).
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(Cost of Fraud) x (F(F, (Frequency of Fraud) - ED(F) (Insurer's Ability to Detect
Fraud at an early date)).
Historically, Co) was viewed as having a high value. Similarly, in
the historical analysis, EDej was viewed to be high because applica-
tion fraud was thought to be relatively easy to detect. These variables
act only to strengthen the degree to which the equation was histori-
cally viewed as tipping to the first side.
The current empirical validity of this analysis can be tested by as-
sessing both historical and current values of each variable.
1. Cap) (Cost of Fraud) x F() (Frequency of Fraud)
It is clear that both C() and Fmj have increased. Insurance fraud is
an enormous societal cost, with an estimated $163 billion paid in
fraudulent property and casualty claims alone from 1985 to 1994.45
Fraud in health care may be higher, with estimates running as high
as $100 billion per year.4 6 One study found that between 35% and
42% of auto injury medical costs were fraudulent or exaggerated. 4 7
Twenty percent of every claims-dollar may be attributable to fraud.48
In disability cases, 12% of fraud may be attributable to concealing a
previous condition, with an additional 16.2% involving misstated in-
come at the time of application, and an additional 6.5% involving mis-
stated occupations. 4 9
Arrests for insurance fraud have risen from 251,000 in 1985, to
331,000 in 1994, a 31.8% increase in nine years.5 0 This statistic
should be viewed in light of the low conviction rate and the minor pen-
alties imposed.5 ' The problem is so massive that in spite of the large
number of arrests, "the track record of insurance fraud detection and
prosecution in the states has been unremarkable. Police and prosecu-
tors have not always followed their legislative mandates. State insur-
45. INSURANCE FRAUD: THE QUIET CATASTROPHE 51 (Conning & Co. 1996).
46. Googins, supra note 44, at 76 n.118.
47. INSURANCE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 55 (quoting RAND INST. FOR CMWL JUSTICE,
THE COSTS OF EXCESS MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES
(1995)).
48. Googins, supra note 44, at 76 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 1871(b) (West 1993)).
49. KATHLEEN FYFFE ET AL., HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, DIsABILrrY
INCOME INSURERS' ANTI-FRAUD PROGRAMS 4-5 (1994).
50. INSURANCE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 8.
51. Id. at 57. For example, while 15% of arson cases lead to arrest, only 2% of arson
cases result in a conviction. One-third of those convicted receive no prison time,
and the remainder generally receive fewer than two years. Id. "Most criminal
law enforcers are interested in highly visible, organized fraud cases and are not
particularly suited or eager to pursue the single policy fraud case." Googins,
supra note 44, at 75. Professor Googins notes that during his term as insurance
commissioner, "a member of the FBI team fighting insurance fraud stressed that
the Bureau was interested in large, high visibility cases because of their news-
worthiness and educational value." Id. at 75 n.110.
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ance departments often are underfunded and understaffed.
Prosecutors often refuse cases unless they involve major organized
fraud."52
Numerous egregious examples of fraud have received attention in
the media:
- New Jersey fraud investigators staged a series of bus accidents in
which the only passengers were fraud investigators. More than 100
individuals either jumped on the bus immediately after the staged ac-
cident or filed claims stating that they were on the bus.53
e Fraud rings involving attorneys, physicians, and fraudulent claim-
ants have spread from automobile injury claims, to workers compen-
sation, to "disability mills ... buying lists of workers that had been
laid off to create false medical reports and bills."54
o A Florida dentist allowed his brothers to chop off a finger to facili-
tate a $1.3 million homeowners claim and a simultaneous disability
claim. A portion of the money was used to purchase a yacht named
the "Minus One."55
* A worker collected $3 million from a worker's compensation claim
and an allegedly botched corrective surgery, claiming that he was to-
tally dependent on his wife for his needs. Video surveillance captured
the insured dancing.56
e A Colombian insured supported his own $500,000 death claim with
a faked death certificate, a rented burial vault, and a fabricated auto-
mobile accident. 57
Societal attitudes toward insurance fraud have also changed.
Twenty-five percent of respondents in a recent survey indicated that
they knew an individual who was collecting worker's compensation
even though capable of working.58 "An estimated 17 percent of the
public would stay out of work and collect income replacement benefits
even after they had fully recovered from their disabling sickness or
injury."59
Acceptability of claim padding, application fraud, and similar prac-
tices is rising:
52. Edward J. Schrenk & Jonathon B. Palmquist, Fraud and Its Effects on the Insur-
ance Industry, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 23, 34 (1997).
53. INSURANCE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 23.
54. Id. at 26.
55. 2 Brothers Held in Amputated Finger Scam, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 13, 1994,
at D8A.
56. Horse Slayings & Digitless Dentist Among Top Ten Frauds, 9 FED & ST. INS. Wyn,
Jan. 23, 1995.
57. Joseph B. Treaster, Faked Deaths Plague Insurance Industry-Number of Cases
Growing at an Alarming Rate, MnN.-ST. PAUL STAR-TRm., July 5, 1997, at 1D.
58. INSURANCE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 51.
59. Andrew S. Bernstein, Tackling Disability Insurance Fraud, NATL UNDERWRITER,
Apr. 28, 1997, at 40 (Life & Health/Fin. Serv. ed.).
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Compared to five years ago, more people today believe that padding and
stretching are acceptable when it comes to insurance claims. According to a
1995 survey conducted by the Insurance Research Council (IRC), 28% believe
that claim-padding is appropriate in order to recover their deductible, and
24% think they can do the same thing to make up for premiums paid in earlier
years.6
0
Beyond this, 14% of the public felt it was acceptable to omit accidents
or tickets from an insurance application. Eleven percent felt that it
was okay to go back to a doctor for treatment after an injury had
healed. A shocking 5% rated as acceptable "[bleing involved with an
organized ring of doctors, lawyers and body shops that file false claims
to get money from insurance companies."
6 1
2. ED() (Insurer's Ability to Detect Fraud at an Early Date)
Traditionally, the medical history of a proposed insured is evalu-
ated through medical records, a medical examination, and contact
with the insured's physician, which is merely optional. The insurer
cannot uniformly rely on the insured's physician, however. One study
found that only 20.7% of physicians in a sample believed that each of
three examples of insurance fraud should be reported. In the remain-
ing cases, criteria such as the patient's overall health and the wealth
of the patient impacted their decision.6 2 Provider fraud in the health
area has increased 75.5% from 1990 to 1992.63 The failure of provid-
ers to respond to requests for records, along with a refusal to release
psychiatric records and refusal to provide information on physical or
mental capacity, is a recognized problem in the disability insurance
industry.64
The insurer's ability to detect fraud also has been hampered by
statute or case law on several fronts. For example, some states ini-
tially placed restrictions on an insurer's ability to use HIV testing in
the application process or to ask questions concerning prior testing.6 5
60. INsURANCE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 25.
61. Id. at 27.
62. Neil J. Farber et al., Confidentiality and Health Insurance Fraud, 157 ARCH. INT.
MED. 501, 501-02 (1997). The insurer's ability to discover fraud is "pivotal to the
philosophical underpinning of the clause." 1 HARETT & LEssNiCK, supra note 28,
§ 507[21, at 5-224. When that ability to investigate is compromised, other policy
assumptions behind strict incontestability are open to question as well.
63. INsURANcE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 67. Provider fraud included fraudulent diag-
nosis, fraudulent dates of treatment, and billing for services not rendered. Id. It
is difficult to imagine providers involved in health fraud cooperating in applica-
tion fraud detection efforts.
64. FYFFE ET AL., supra note 49, at 9-10.
65. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120980(f) (West. Supp. 1996)(stating
that insurers may not use results of HIV blood tests to determine insurabil-
ity)(limited to policies prior to September 26, 1989, see by CAL. INS. CODE art. 6.9,
§ 799.02 (West. Supp. 1996)); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.90 (West 1995 & Supp.
1997)(insurers may not inquire into whether an applicant has taken an HIV test).
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In some states, a provider may refuse to release psychiatric or psycho-
logical records if, in the judgment of the provider, access would have a
negative impact on the health of the patient.66 Under one judicial de-
cision, a hospital may decline to release records despite an authoriza-
tion if releasing the record would be harmful to "an important
program of the custodian of the records."6 7 Access to records of sub-
stance abuse require special authorizations and may meet with par-
tial or limited disclosure due to the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970.68
Medical examination also is less valuable than previously. Improv-
ing medical technology has increased the latency time between diag-
nosis of a disease and disability or death from the disease.6 9 This
makes the disease more difficult to detect, even if a medical examina-
tion accompanies the policy. It also means that "waiting out" the con-
testability provision may be easier for the insured. As a result, other
commentary has suggested that the period of incontestability should
be extended from two years to five years. The reasoning behind this
argument is that the two year period, fixed before 1950, was chosen in
the context of life insurance. The period may have been chosen due to
a belief that "if an applicant with a terminal illness misrepresented
his health condition, death would result in two years."7 O In contrast,
when improved medical treatment extends life spans, "there may be a
greater incentive for the applicant to withhold material information
and gamble on the likelihood that they will live longer than two
years."71
Judicial decisions also have impacted this area. At least some deci-
sions have allowed incontestability to be enforced when it is proven
that the insured sent an imposter to the medical exam. 72 Medical
records and other documents also can be falsified. Technology, includ-
These statutes create a "catch-22" in that one of the policies behind incontestabil-
ity is to encourage investigation into the insured's medical condition. Thus, in-
contestability is mandated because the insurer "failed to investigate." At the
same time, the investigation is elsewhere prohibited by statute.
66. See, e.g., COLO. Rsv. STAT. § 25-1-801 (1994).
67. Cynthia B. v. New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 458 N.E.2d 363, 365 (N.Y. 1983).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (1995).
69. Googins, supra note 44, at 76. Googins notes a telling comment from Karen A.
Clifford & Russell P. Iuculano, Aids and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Re-
lated Testing, 100 HARv. L. Ruv. 1806 (1987). "[It becomes relatively simple for
an individual with knowledge of his or her infected status to make misrepresen-
tation regarding such knowledge with reasonable assurance that the incontest-
ability period will expire before 'suspicious' symptoms appear." Id. at 1819.
70. Greg C. Oberland, Fraudulent Misrepresentations Discovered After the Contesta-
ble Period-Is There a Defense?, 1995 I'VL CLAn s Ass'N LrFE INS. WORKSHOP
REP. 60, 60-61.
71. Id. at 64-65.
72. See Amex Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 1264 (Cal. 1997).
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ing optical scanners, makes it increasingly easy to forge documents
submitted with an application or claim.7 3 Another sophisticated use
allows fraudulent claimants to alter photographs submitted to insur-
ers as documentation of loss.
Finally, it should be remembered that the insurer's access to infor-
mation regarding the insured is to some extent controlled by the in-
sured. If an applicant fails to disclose a source of medical treatment
on an application, the insurer's devices to locate the truth are limited.
Most insurers use the Medical Information Bureau, a clearing house
of insurance reports on medical information. But, the system is con-
tingent on the information contained in it. Most adverse information
comes from declined applications from other insurers. When adverse
information is unreported or undiscovered by other insurers, the value
of this tool is limited.74 Interviews of the applicant's associates are
expensive, intrusive, and vulnerable to manipulation by persons sym-
pathetic to the insured. Of course the availability of anonymous test-
ing for disorders such as HIV opens yet another possible means of
manipulating the system.
3. CW (Evidentiary Cost of Absence of Insured and/or Passage
of Time)
Most cases applying the first manifest doctrine involve the accident
and sickness line, and, in particular, disability policies. Policy consid-
erations behind incontestability are weaker in these cases. As one
court notes,
(1) in a contest of an accident and sickness policy, the insured is generally
alive and can testify to protect his rights while in the case of life insurance he
is no longer available to rebut adverse claims of the insurer and the broader
incontestable clause is needed to safeguard the rights of the beneficiary; (2)
although a physical examination is required before a substantial life insur-
ance policy is issued, most accident and sickness policies are written without
such an examination and the benefit of the information it reveals; (3) in most
life insurance contracts there can be only one claim on each policy and in a
73. Schrenk & Palmquist, supra note 52, at 26 (quoting Gene Rappe, High-Tech
Criminals Dupe Claims Professionals, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, May 22, 1995, at 13
(Prop. & CasiRisk & Benefits Mgmt. ed.). Document fraud can be low-tech as
well. For example, a Massachusetts man forged forms from both his physician
and employer to support a disability claim. When discovered, the insured "stated
that the insurance proceeds were used for her car payments." Insurance Fraud
Bureau of Mass., "Disability Benefits Used for Car Payments" Case Update (vis-
ited Feb. 19, 1996) <http://www.ifb.orgt129522.htm> (on file with Author).
74. After one policy was declined, the insured in the one case altered the spelling of
his name (from C. Tony to Anthony C.) and his birthdate on an application to a
second insurer. Fioretti v. Massachusetts Gen. Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d 1228 (11th
Cir. 1995). Efforts such as this appear to be designed to create confusion and
defeat any use of pooled information.
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fixed amount while accident and health insurance subjects the insurer to
many claims in varying amounts which can be potentially large.7
5
Courts and legislatures quickly recognized that much of the policy
behind incontestability was not a good fit with lines of law other than
life insurance laws. In 1922, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners recognized this concern and suggested that insurers
should be allowed to exempt from the operation of the statute disabil-
ity and accidental death benefits appended to a life insurance con-
tract.7 6 Approximately one-half of the states have followed the
recommendation, 77 and these statutes were well received by the
courts.7 8
75. Taylor v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 214 A.2d 109, 115-16 (N.H. 1965).
Another differing rationale is that for life insurance claims, the clause
functions to protect innocent beneficiaries who had no part in the origi-
nal fraud. This is untrue in disability cases. In a parallel context, one
court dealt with the issue of whether the risk of misrepresentation
should be allocated to an insured or insurer under a compulsory no-fault.
In a case in which the insured misrepresented information, and filed a
claim one hour after the binder was issued, the court stated that there
was no reason in law or policy for the burden of such a risk to be placed
on the insurer in preference to the insured who made the intentional
material misrepresentations.... [No question of reliance on the binder
by the public is presented, because the claim for personal protection ben-
efits is made by an insured who made intentional material misrepresen-
tations, rather than an innocent third party.
United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 348 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
76. MURIEL L. CRAwr.oD & Wmnuin T. BEADLEs, LAW AND THE LnrE INsURANCE CON-
TRAcT 432 (6th ed. 1989).
77. Id. Actually, the recommendation has been incompletely followed. The amend-
ment may be made to statutes governing life insurance policies, but not to paral-
lel incontestability statutes governing accident and health policies. As a result,
disability benefits appended to a life insurance contract may be contestable for
material misrepresentation, while a stand-alone disability policy purchased at
the same time, from the same company, could be incontestable or contestable
only on the basis of fraud. Compare MwN. STAT. § 61A.03(1)(c) (Supp. 1996)(stat-
ing that disability benefit provisions of a life insurance policy may be exempted
from incontestability), with MmN. STAT. § 62A.04(2)(a) (Supp. 1996)(stating that
in accident and health insurance policies, statements are contestable after two
years only for a fraudulent misstatement). The result is a strong argument for
the first manifest doctrine in some jurisdictions. A legislative intent to exempt
disability benefits from the operation of life incontestability statutes altogether
should at least translate into a narrow reading of parallel incontestability stat-
utes pertaining to an accident and health disability contract. The same policy
concerns support an identical interpretation of the same kind of benefit in both
lines.
78. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Deem, 91 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1937).
The Deem court stated that "[tbo make a contract incontestable after the lapse of
a brief time is to confer upon its holder extraordinary privileges. We must be on
our guard against turning them into weapons of oppression." Id. at 575 (quoting
American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937)).
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4. Aa) (Relatively Lower Ability of Beneficiary to Successfully
Present Evidence of True State of Affairs to Court)
This variable addresses a presumed difference in resources be-
tween the "large insurer" and the lone beneficiary. While this picture
may have had validity in the early 1900s, several factors have
changed. First, it is easier for the modern consumer to find and fund
counsel to pursue a case. The willingness of plaintiffs' counsel to ac-
cept cases on a contingent fee has increased.79 Televised advertising
has made it easier for an insured to locate counsel ready, willing, and
eager to take on an insurer.
Second, beginning in the 1980s, precedent in a number of jurisdic-
tions has allowed an insured to recover attorney's fees when it is "rea-
sonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the
benefits due under a policy."80
Third, the rules of civil procedure have changed to make class ac-
tions easier to certify and available to correct any abusive practice
that affects a group of individuals. In the days when warranty was
used abusively by some insurers, each insured faced an individual bat-
tle. Equity courts were more comfortable with class actions than law
courts. The original federal rules provided a difficult-to-apply rule de-
fining "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class actions.8 ' The rule was
rewritten in 1966 and became more frequently used.
[U]nder the 1966 revision of the federal rules the class action seemed to be a
vehicle ideally adapted to the task of redressing wrongs that the general pub-
lic had traditionally been forced to suffer in silence .... It would be an exag-
geration to say that people flocked to the courts in swarms and clogged the
dockets with class actions. However, newspapers abounded in stories of class
actions, and the federal advance sheets were full of them.8 2
Fourth, the power difference has been altered by the ability of the
insured to conduct broad discovery. In an individual case in which the
insured believes that a pattern or practice has occurred, the insured
79. Indeed, contingent fees were not available at the time the incontestability debate
began.
The American Bar Association, reflecting the history of the development
of the contingent fee as one of grudging acceptance, gave its reluctant
approval in 1908. Subsequent developments have accelerated the ac-
ceptance and use of contingent fees. Extensions of tort liability have in-
creased plaintiffs' likelihood of prevailing. . . . [In turn, this has
increased the number of lawyers willing to accept contingency fee
arrangements.
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 37-38 (1989).
80. Brandt v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 796, 798 (Cal. 1985).
81. MILTON D. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 98-99 (1979).
82. Id. at 96. "[Cllass actions filings have increased dramatically, to a point where it
is argued that they have become strike suits, filed by attorneys seeking fat fees
but producing few other real benefits." MARY KAY KANE, CrvIL PROCEDURE IN A
NUTSHELL § 8.1, at 226-27 (1979).
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may be allowed to conduct wide ranging discovery of other litigation,
claim denials, or complaints involving the insurer.8 3 In practice, this
type of discovery probably creates more abuse than it prevents. Nev-
ertheless, it again is an indication that the power balance between
insured and insurer has changed.
Finally, the modern insured has an increased ability to preemp-
tively sue or countersue under changing legal theories. This can allow
the insured to abort the investigative process if a claim is filed. In
spite of qualified immunity in many states, insurers may face defama-
tion suits for reporting suspected fraud.8 4 One attorney discussing
the problem notes that "[ylour field report on a $10,000 claim can cost
you $100,000 even if you win on summary judgment."8 5 The use of
independent medical examinations is also under attack, with in-
dependent medical examiners facing the possibility of being named in-
dividually in a suit.8 6 The "power difference" in these figures is the
reverse of the classic assumptions.
5. CQo) (Cost of Insurer Overreaching)
This concern essentially is a stereotypical fear that insurers will
use any opportunity to overreach and take advantage of insureds.
Much of the historical concern with insurer overreaching grew from
the characterization of statements in the application as warranties in
the late 1800s and early 1900s. Warranty is a concept from marine
insurance, which was grafted onto the fledgling life insurance
industry.
[A] warranty must be absolutely and literally true, and a forfeiture will result
ifmerely the falsehood of the statement can be shown, irrespective of its mate-
riality. A company need prove only that a warranted statement is incorrect.
The courts assume that the materiality of the thing warranted has been es-
tablished and that all inquiry on the subject is precluded. 8 7
In maritime law, no hardship flowed from the use of warranties be-
cause of the short time between the making of the contract and any
dispute over the validity of the contract.8 8 Applied to life insurance, a
warranty could have harsh application, allowing the contract to be de-
83. See, e.g., Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d 86 (Cal.
1982)(allowing discovery of the identity of other policyholders potentially subject
to an alleged improper business practice of the insurer).
84. Douglas McLeod, As If Fraud Weren't Expensive Enough: Suspects May Sue In-
surers for Defamation, Bus. INs., June 16, 1997, at 10.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)(involving an
employee who sued his employer and two psychiatrists used to examine the em-
ployee in connection with a request for disability leave under the California Con-
fidentiality of Medical Information Act and various tort theories).
87. KENNEmT BLAciK, JR. & HARoLD SKIPPER, JR., LiFr INSURANCE 126 (11th ed. 1987).
88. CRAWFoRD & BEADLEs, supra note 76, at 423-24. Maritime law disputes gener-
ally involve commercially sophisticated parties as well.
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feated for statements that were not material to the assumption of the
risk. The use of warranties in applications subsequently has been pre-
vented by statute in most states8 9 and rarely is used by the industry
in life and health insurance.
The second major change between the early 1900s and present day
has been the rise of first-party bad faith actions. If insurers were mo-
tivated to overreach, this doctrine controls the tendency. A first-party
bad faith action allows the insured to recover tort damages, including
punitive damages and attorneys fees, in a dispute over the adminis-
tration of an insurance contract. Without first-party bad faith, the in-
sured is limited to contract remedies and damages. The leading
precedent in these cases arose in 1973, in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insur-
ance Co.90 Since then, the doctrine has continued to evolve. A recent
study by the RAND corporation found that 12.8% of insurance ver-
dicts in a multijurisdiction sample awarded punitive damages.91 In
California, the figure was 19.1%.92 The median punitive award na-
tionwide in insurance cases was $652,000, with 10% of the awards ex-
ceeding $13.5 million.93 The study concluded by noting that
because punitive damages can be many times the compensatory award...
their size is less predictable. Individuals and organizations may find it more
difficult to develop expectations as to both the kinds of behavior that will re-
sult in a punitive award and the amount of any such award.... Critics of the
current system, for example, argue that the risk of a very large punitive
award sometimes drives defendants to settle cases in which they believe the
claim is not meritorious, or to settle meritorious claims for far too much....
The literature on risk perception and management in decisionmaking sug-
gests that in assessing risks, most business decisionmakers focus on worst
case scenarios and will go to great lengths to avoid exposing their companies
to very large financial losses.9 4
In short, the "power differential" that concerned the formulators of
incontestability may well have not only been closed, but actually
reversed.
Third, regulation of insurers has increased in the decades since the
early 1900s.
In the last several decades we have seen the elaborate development of state
insurance codes dictating the construction of contracts and requiring their fl-
ing, the increased use of mandated coverages, and the enactment of entire
contract laws. More importantly still is the development and strengthening of
consumer affairs (complaint) staffs within the Insurance Departments and
89. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 87, at 126-27.
90. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
91. ERIK MOLLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITrvE DAMAGES IN
FINANCIAL INjURy JURY VERDICTS 22 (1997).
92. Id. at 35. Punitive damage awards were "considerably higher in California rela-
tive to the other states in the database." Id. at 34. The mean punitive award in
the sample was $2.9 million. Id.
93. Id. at 29.
94. Id. at xi.
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Market Conduct Divisions specifically designed to examine the sales and
claims practices of insurers.... This development has been coupled with the
growth of organized consumer groups that assist identification of questionable
trade practices. Multistate market conduct exams have been initiated.
9 5
In summary, the use of strict incontestability to control any per-
ceived tendency of insurers to overreach 96 is at best an elaborate re-
dundant backup system to antiwarranty statutes, tort doctrines, and
state regulation. The cost of this fourth backup system is high in that
fraud is tolerated.
6. Cas, (Cost of Loss of Security Felt by Insured)
This variable arose again in the life insurance context and contains
an implicit assumption that the insured is entitled to security. It is
unquestionable that an applicant who has been honest is entitled to
the security of the contract he obtains. There are limits to this princi-
ple when fraud is involved, however.
It does not necessarily follow... that frauds and cheats are entitled to the
same comfort. Why should frauds-criminals, to be blunt about it-be enti-
tled to the warm and fuzzy feeling of repose? Certainly, no public policy rea-
son exist to protect frauds unless their protection is an unavoidable evil as the
only way innocent insureds are provided the comfort to which they are
entitled.97
The remedy that a court can grant under the first manifest doc-
trine also acts to reduce the value of Cazs), as will be discussed.98
Finally, changes in the social safety net since the early 1900s also
have somewhat reduced the value of this variable. The loss of benefits
to a beneficiary of a life policy in a single-income family in the early
1900s (or worse, in the Depression years) was devastating. In the
1990s, social devices such as social security disability, welfare, Medi-
caid, and state cash sickness programs provide alternate, albeit less
complete, methods of mitigating a loss of income.
7. TC(, (Transactional Cost of Litigation)
This variable revolves around the concern that incontestability dis-
courages litigation and thereby reduces the transactional costs associ-
ated with the insurance system. Appleman states the issue as one in
95. Googins, supra note 44, at 70.
96. In the Author's practice and belief, the industry is filled with claims personnel
whose primary concern is paying legitimate claims. The good faith belief that an
individual claim may be improper or even fraudulent is far from the type of over-
reaching on warranty issues described as occurring in the late 1800s and early
1900s.
97. Googins, supra note 44, at 69.
98. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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which without incontestability, "litigation could otherwise be in-
creased manyfold."99
This concern probably is mitigated by developments discussed
above in the areas of bad faith and increased insurer regulation.10 0
With respect to fraud, the concern may be philosophically flawed as
well. "Additional litigation which helps identify and eliminate the ef-
fects of fraud cannot appropriately be described as 'excessive litiga-
tion."'10 1 Finally, as discussed below, the first manifest doctrine
actually may simplify any litigation by reducing the issues for trial
and avoiding speculation on state of mind.102
C. Incentives from the Insured's Perspective
It should be remembered that the individuals considering fraud
also base their behavior on a cost/benefit analysis. That analysis in-
volves some of the same factors described for the policy analysis and
can be roughly stated as B() / (Cm) x PrD)) + (Cp) x P(p)) + Cem), where BqF
is the benefit of fraud; (Cm) x P(D)) is the cost of detection times the
probability of detection; (C(p) x P~p)) is the cost of prosecution times the
probability of prosecution; and Cm) is the perceived moral cost of fraud
to the individual. If B() > (CD) x P(D)) + (Cp) x P()) + CM), the individ-
ual will commit fraud.
In individual cases, B(F can be quite high. In one case discussed
later in this Article, the insured secured $560,000 per year in disabil-
ity income and business overhead expense coverage, an amount well
in excess of his income.10 3 In contrast, CD) is low in that the individ-
ual simply has premiums returned to him for the policy. P(D) is rela-
tively low due to the decreases discussed in ED(F-the insurer's
ability for early detection of fraud.i04 PP) is low due to the disinterest
of authorities in prosecuting individual fraud cases, and C(p) is low as
compared to other crimes.1 0 5 Historically, Ce) has been high. In-
creases in the public's acceptance of fraud, however, suggest that this
variable is dropping.106
99. 1A APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 43, § 311, at 305.
100. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
101. Googins, supra note 44, at 69.
102. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of Scalia v. Lafayette Life Insurance Co., see infra notes 113-20
and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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D. A Comparative Analysis: First Manifest and Fraudulent
Misstatement
One issue that arose in Haas, and which is discussed in other first
manifest cases, is that statutes in some states allow for an alternative
formulation of incontestability when an exception is made for fraudu-
lent misstatements. One argument against the adoption of a first
manifest doctrine is that with the option to insert this clause, insurers
may adequately fight fraud. The argument continues that by their
election not to use the alternate clause, insurers voluntarily have pro-
vided a higher level of protection, which countenances fraud.
One answer to this argument simply notes that the deceptive
transfer of known losses is contrary to the basic principles of insur-
ance and should be contrary to public policy. The contracts, with
either version of the clause, attempt to exclude known losses. The law
simply should not tolerate fraud, rather than bend contract language
to protect and nurture it. This argument essentially is that since the
insurer could have made its contract even stronger, it has failed to
prevent fraud, and the system must tolerate the cost. Economic anal-
ysis, however, suggests that the insured who conceals a known loss is
in fact the least-cost risk avoider.
An even more detailed analysis suggests that the use of first mani-
fest jurisprudence is a more economically efficient solution to several
issues than is the use of fraudulent misrepresentation clauses. Con-
sider initially the transactional cost of litigation, the TL variable dis-
cussed above. One rationale for incontestability is that the clause
reduces litigation. As between a first manifest question and a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation question, the former is a less judicially burden-
some litigation. The issues are largely objective ones, possibly even
subject to resolution in a summary judgment context:
" Did the condition manifest prior to the issuance of the policy?
" Was the condition disclosed on the application?
" Does the claim involve the same condition?
In contrast, fraudulent misrepresentation necessarily involves sub-
jective questions regarding the insured's intentions and state of
mind.o 7 It will involve issues such as insurer reliance and may veer
into insurer underwriting guidelines and their interpretation of select
cases. These issues tend to produce factual questions that, depending
on the case, can be more difficult to resolve without a full jury trial.
In a related effect, the first manifest doctrine levels the playing
field with respect to the A(A variable. The concern here is that given
107. Depending on the jurisdiction, proof of fraud may require a heightened showing,
variously stated as "clear, cogent and convincing" or "clear, precise and indubita-
ble." 37 A. JVLT 2D, Fraud and Deceit § 468 (1968).
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the presumed greater resources of the insurer, the ability of the in-
sured to present its case is far lower than the insurer. By reducing the
issues and their complexity, this perceived "power differential" is
lessened.
Finally, remember the Cs) variable. This is the cost of the loss of
security argument used to support incontestability. Assume that
fraud is committed. Use of a fraudulent misrepresentation statute in-
volves a contest of the policy and is therefore an all or nothing scena-
rio. If fraud is demonstrated, the risk of the known loss is shifted back
to the insured-along with the risk of every unknown loss.
In contrast, the first manifest doctrine allows the policy to remain
in effect, with certain conditions excluded. Under the C(s) rationale,
the first manifest doctrine produces a lower cost. Beyond this, the
risk-sharing function is enhanced in that the risk of unknown loss is
still spread among the various parties involved.
E. Summary
A review of the historical concerns that led to incontestability
shows that these concerns have changed over the last several decades:
VARIABLE HISTORIC ANALYSIS MODERN TRENDS
F0 Fraud is Infrequent Increased public acceptance;
Increased incidence of fraud
C() Fraud has a low cost Cost is $100 billion or more per
year
ED, Insurers can detect fraud early in Privacy statutes; Anonymous
the underwriting process testing; Increased disease latency;
Less physician cooperation;
Imposter cases
TC Insurers will unleash a flood of Rise of bad faith jurisprudence;
litigation without incontestability Increased state regulation
C(p) Insurers will use absence of Antiwarranty statutes; Rise of bad
incontestability to take advantage faith jurisprudence; Increased
of insureds state regulation
Cas) Insureds will lose the security of Frauds should not be entitled to
their contract profit from fraud
Co Insured will be unavailable to Only applicable to life insurance
testify if policy is contested
A,) Insured is less able to litigate Contingent Fees; Recovery of
Attorneys Fees; Class Actions;
Broad Discovery
In the historical analysis, the costs from policy concerns supporting
incontestability were high, while those from fraud were low. As a re-
sult, judges sought a rule of law that minimized the costs of factors
supporting incontestability. Since that time, however, other areas of
law have developed to minimize these factors. At the same time, the
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cost of fraud and the frequency of fraud have increased. The Haas
court, noting the increase in fraud, crafted a rule of law that sought to
minimize that cost. This swing in judicial precedent can be predicted
on a law and economics perspective and can be expected to continue.
Some jurisdictions have reached conclusions similar to Haas, while
others have reached entirely different results. The next section turns
to that analysis.
III. THE FIRST MANIFEST DOCTRINE IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
Two courts have followed the Haas decision. Krakowiak v. Paul
Revere Life Insurance Co.-08 applied the rule in Tennessee. In Krako-
wiak, the insured concealed that he had been diagnosed as HIV-posi-
tive when applying for a disability policy.10 9 The policy contained a
statutorily required incontestable clause almost identical to the clause
in Haas and defined sickness as "sickness or disease which first
manifests after the Date of Issue."11O It also contained a strong limi-
tation for preexisting conditions: "We will not pay benefits for a pre-
existing condition if it was not disclosed on your application. You are
responsible for verifying the accuracy of each and every statement on
your application. Also, We will not pay benefits for any loss We have
excluded by name or specific description."'
Four years after the issuance of the policy, the insured claimed dis-
ability due to AIDS. The insurer defended on the basis that the condi-
tion had first manifested prior to issuance of the policy. The decision
again revolved around explicit policy considerations: the plaintiff pro-
posed a system whereby the incontestability clause would grant the
same degree of protection to insureds who fraudulently misrepresent
their medical status to those who are unknowingly afflicted by an ill-
ness that does not manifest itself prior to the issuance of the policy.
To adopt such a system would encourage dishonesty and reward de-
ception contrary to clear public policy. Consumers should neither be
encouraged nor allowed to purchase insurance for a risk that is known
to have already occurred.1i 2 With these concerns, the court held that
a limitation of coverage to conditions that manifest after the issuance
of the policy was not a contest of the policy.
Paul Revere does not contest the validity of the policy due to fraudulent mis-
representations made by plaintiff in his application for insurance. Paul Re-
vere contends that the policy's limiting definition of covered sickness excludes
plaintiffs claim from coverage under the policy....
108. No. 95-249-I, 1996 WL 303661, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 1996).
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *6.
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... [Tihe incontestability clause relates only to the validity of the contract
and should not affect in any way whatsoever the construction of the terms of
the policy....
... Plaintiff was diagnosed and treated as MIV-positive before the policy
was issued. Therefore, plaintiff is not covered under Paul Revere's policy
which limits covered sicknesses to those which first manifest themselves after
the policy was issued. 1 1 3
Scalia v. Lafayette Life Insurance Co. 114 provided an example of
the potentially high rewards of application fraud. The case is an ex-
ample of the increase in Cj. Scalia had suffered injuries in an auto-
mobile accident in 1985, which led to a permanent ulnar neuropathy
in his right arm. Dr. Scalia also suffered leg injuries that made it diffi-
cult for him to stand for extended periods of time, other injuries re-
quiring more than 300 stitches, a skull fracture, and a bone graft.1 1 5
The injuries prevented him from performing his occupation as a den-
tist, and he collected on various disability policies through September
1988, at which time his claim ended through an agreed lump sum
settlement.116
After the settlement, Scalia began to amass additional disability
policies, securing coverage of $560,000 per year on eleven policies.ll7
At the time, his annual income was approximately $169,000,118 mean-
ing that Scalia stood to recover $391,000 more per year on a tax-free
basis than he had previously made on a taxable basis. Although the
representations to each carrier varied, he generally disclosed that he
was in a car accident in 1985, but represented that he had made a full
recovery. He failed to disclose the severity of the injuries, that he was
under continuing care for these injuries, or that he had received disa-
bility benefits for three years as a result of the injuries.1 39 In Febru-
ary 1991, Scalia filed a claim on all of the policies, alleging that ulnar
113. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). Some older Tennessee authority would have sup-
ported this holding. In Childress v. Fraternal Union, 82 S.W. 832 (Tenn. 1904),
the court dealt with an argument that an incontestability clause barred use of
another clause in a fraternal benefit policy, which reduced the indemnity to one
third in the event of suicide. The court rejected the argument, noting that "the
suicide clause is not one which enters into the original validity of the contract,
but one which defeats the right of recovery after the full existence of the contract
is established." Id. at 833. The same is true of the limitation in Krakowiak v.
Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., No. 95-249-I, 1996 WL 303661, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. June 7, 1996).
114. No. Civ.A.92-3714, 1995 WL 631841, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 1995), affd, 114 F.3d
1173 (3d Cir. 1997)(Table No. 96-5341).
115. Id. at *1-2.
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *6.
119. Id. at *6-7 (reviewing misrepresentations on Revere coverage); id. at *11 (review-
ing Lloyds coverage); id. at *15 (reviewing Lafayette coverage).
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neuropathy resulting from a fall at home, which disabled him from
performing dentistry.i 20
Citing Haas, the court granted summary judgment to the insurers
involved in the suit. The summary judgment was affirmed by the
Third Circuit, which stated that "Dr. Scalia may not reap the benefit
of deception by recovering for a disability that he concealed on his ap-
plication solely because of the incontestability clause."i21
Other courts have reached the same result outside of the Haas line
of cases. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co. v. Formani 2 2 allows a
first manifest defense based on the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
language in a Florida contract. In Forman, the insured concealed both
a two and four week hospitalization for diabetes less than a year prior
to the issuance of his policy.1 2 3 Nineteen months after the issuance of
the policy, he filed a claim for disability due to diabetes. The insurer
learned of the diabetes in May 1972, thirty months after the policy
was issued.' 2 4
Forman's policy contained both a statutory incontestability clause
and an insuring clause providing coverage against "[slickness which
first manifests itself during the term of the policy."1 2 5 The court
framed the issue as whether the incontestability clause expanded the
insuring clause:
In this case the condition for which Forman claimed benefits had "first mani-
fested" itself almost a year before the policy became effective. Thus disability
resulting from diabetes was never within the scope of policy coverage, and
Forman cannot now claim diabetes-related disability benefits unless the in-
contestability provisions of the policy caused this prior-existing illness to be-
come covered.1 2 6
The court had little difficulty in concluding that the incontestable
clause did not expand coverage. "This statutory clause only prohibits
denials of claims based on the prior existence of a disease. Such deni-
als are irrelevant here because a disease is covered no matter when it
existed, so long as it was not first manifested prior to the policy
120. Id. at *3.
121. Scalia v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., No. 96-5341, slip op. at 17 (3d Cir. Apr. 24, 1997).
Haas also was applied in a recent case in which the Eleventh Circuit applied New
Jersey law under a choice of law question. See Fioretti v. Massachusetts Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d 1128 (11th Cir. 1995). In addition to altering his name,
birthdate, and social security number, the insured sent an impostor to a required
blood test so that the insured could obtain life coverage despite his HIV-positive
status. Id. at 1230-31. Citing Haas as authority that fraud could be a basis for
denying a claim after contestability, the court recognized an "impostor exception"
to an incontestability clause and allowed the claim to be denied despite the pas-
sage of more than two years. Id. at 1237.
122. 516 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1975).
123. Id. at 427.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 428.
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date."127 The court also noted that the concealment altered any policy
concerns in favor of contestability:
[WIhere coverage is framed in terms of first manifestation and the misrepre-
sentation of no prior history of diabetes goes to the heart of the definition of
coverage, the principle of not permitting incontestability to broaden the scope
of coverage attains especially strong force. There is little reason to decline to
give it full effect. The policy of protecting the insured from belated discovery
that he has no coverage loses much of its vitality.1 2 8
In terms of the previous economic analysis, this is an explicit state-
ment that Caz) is a less valid concern in cases of fraud. The Forman
court ultimately struck the same balance as the Haas court, conclud-
ing that "[tlhough the policy continues in effect it, of course, does not
cover diabetes." 129
The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, recognized the defense
in Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Sapp.13 0 In Sapp, the insured
concealed a diagnosis of HIV and later claimed disability due to AIDS.
Paul Revere denied the claim, and the insured sued, claiming that any
misrepresentations as to his condition were incontestable. Citing Cali-
fornia law defining the purpose of insurance, the court disagreed.
It is axiomatic that insurance does not cover known losses. Insurance covers
the risk of loss. California Insurance Code § 22 provides that "[i]nsurance is a
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage,
or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event." Section 22 forms
part of every contract of insurance. If uncertainty exists in statutory interpre-
tation, we presume the legislature intended a reasonable result consistent
with the statute's purpose, not absurd consequences. We consider the inter-
pretation urged by Sapp that section 10350.2 was intended to cover losses
127. Id. at 429. A review of Forman makes it is clear that the rise in insurance fraud
was the driving force behind the decision. As one commentator has noted,
[slome might view Haas, in isolation, as a case that simply puts New
Jersey in the Forman defense camp which rejects the Wischmeyer and
Bell line of decisions. However, such a reading does not properly account
for the substantial discussion of fraud and the breadth of the court's lan-
guage. Had the court simply wished to embrace Forman, it could have
done so by resting upon the recognition of the "exist-manifest" distinc-
tion-one the court found to be "valid."
Googins, supra note 44, at 62.
128. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 1975).
129. Id. at 431. In a case in which the incontestability issue arose in another context,
the Fifth Circuit, applying Florida law, held that the clause did not bar a showing
that a preexisting illness had contributed to a death in an accidental death only
policy. Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 563 F.2d 1240, 1241-42 (5th Cir. 1977). The
Fifth Circuit allowed a first manifest defense applying Georgia law in Keaten v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 648 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1981). Keaten involved a con-
cealed heart condition. The court enforced the first manifest language in the pol-
icy as against a claim of incontestability. "To hold otherwise, would be to expand
coverage thereby forcing liability upon the insurer for risks it never intended to
assume." Id. at 301.
130. No. 93-56290, 1994 WL 259328, at *2 (9th Cir. June 13, 1994).
[Vol. 76:819
INSURANCE FRAUD
known to the insured to be an absurd consequence, contrary to the basic prin-
ciples of insurance and section 22 of the California Insurance Code.
1 3 1
Sapp is an explicit statement of the free rider problem that occurs
when known losses are introduced into the risk pool.
In Button v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,132 the Ninth
Circuit foreshadowed the result in Sapp under Arizona law. In But-
ton, the insured's policy provided for a limited term of benefits for sick-
ness. The policy defined the cause as sickness if the loss "(a) results
from injuries caused or contributed to by disease, or (b) results from
disease or infection, or medical or surgical treatment therefor . . .
whether the disease or infection is the proximate or a contributing
cause of the loss." 133 In contrast, the policy provided lifetime benefits
if the disability was the result of an accident independent of all other
causes.
1 3 4
Button suffered a lower back injury after a fall in 1979. But, But-
ton had had lower back problems dating back to the 1960s, and his
treating physician testified that the injury and the preexisting back
condition were not independent of each other.' 3 5 Button argued that
any reference to the prior problems was barred by the incontestability
clause. The court ruled that the clause was irrelevant as the clause
"relates to the validity of the contract and not to the construction of
policy provisions."136
131. Id. (citations omitted). The court relied in part on two older California cases. In
Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 89 P.2d 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939), the
court upheld a denial of coverage for preexisting tuberculosis, stating that
[a]n incontestable clause in an insurance policy does not extend the cov-
erage beyond the terms of the policy. Therefore, it does not relieve the
insured (appellant) from the burden of proving that the disease from
which he is suffering originated and occurred after the issuance of the
policies nor prevent the insurer (respondent) from proving that the dis-
ease originated before the date of the issuance of the policies.
Id at 738. See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 237 P.2d 510, 515 (Cal.
1951)(stating that the incontestability clause does not bar reformation of a policy
due to misrepresented age in accordance with age adjustment provisions in the
policy). There is older, possibly inconsistent authority in dicta in McMackin v.
Great American Reserve Insurance Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
The majority in McMackin dealt with interpretation of a recurrent disability pro-
vision. The insurer also urged that the insured had concealed conditions. It is
unclear if these conditions were related to the cause of disability. The final sen-
tence of the opinion, however, states that the insurer "cannot now urge that
plaintiffs disability resulted from a pre-existing disease, illness or injury not cov-
ered by the policy." Id. at 234-35.
132. 847 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
133. Id. at 586.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 585-86.
136. The Button court was not required to reach the first manifest question for its
holding, noting that "[tihe determining factor here is causation, not the insured's
physical condition on the date of the policy." Id. at 589. Nevertheless, the court
cited older first manifest law with approval, discussing Posner v. New York Life
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Mississippi recognized the first manifest doctrine in Prudence Life
Insurance Co. v. Cochran.13 7 This case involved an older version of
the first manifest language, which provided that "'[slickness' as used
in this policy means sickness or disease contracted and commencing
after the policy has been maintained in force for not less than thirty
days from its date and causing loss of time commencing while the pol-
icy is in force." 138 The insured admitted to suffering rheumatoid ar-
thritis, but failed to disclose treatment immediately prior to the
issuance of the policy.13 9
The court held that the issue was not whether the partial disclo-
sure was a misstatement that implicated the incontestability clause.
Rather, "[u]nder the facts established by plaintiffs testimony his disa-
bling sickness resulted from rheumatoid arthritis which 'commenced'
before the policy had been in force for thirty days. Plaintiffs right to
recover is therefore excluded by the express terms of the policy."' 40
Alabama allowed use of the incontestability clause after a review of
numerous older cases from other jurisdictions and treatises. The pol-
icy at issue in National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Mixonl4l was
a critical illness policy with blindness as one of the covered conditions.
But, the policy contained a requirement that the loss be "caused solely
by disease or injuries contracted or sustained after the Date of Is-
sue."142 The court noted that there was a "valid distinction between a
pre-existing disease or suicide clause.., and a clause.., to preclude
Insurance Co., 106 P.2d 488 (Ariz. 1940). In Posner, the insured concealed a pre-
existing condition of diabetes. The Posner court held that the incontestability
clause in the policy did not bar the insurer from denying a claim on the basis of a
preexisting condition.
It must be observed that the defense was not that the policy was invalid
because of previous existing disease, but that the disability claimed by
plaintiff was not covered by the terms of the policy. This court has held
that policies of this nature do not extend to and cover disabilities which
have their origin in injury or disease commencing before the issuance of
the policy.
Id. at 492. Posner predated the standard promulgated by the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for the incontestability statute in Ari-
zona, but was found significant by the court. Button v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 847 F.2d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988). Despite
the intervening passage of the statute, precedent such as Posner is relevant as to
how the statue should be interpreted.
137. 183 So. 2d 830 (Miss. 1966).
138. Id. at 831.
139. Id. at 832.
140. Id. The Fifth Circuit determined that the first manifest doctrine was so well es-
tablished in Mississippi that a recent first manifest case was dismissed as insuffi-
cient on its face pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neville v. American Republic Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1990)(applying
Mississippi law).
141. 282 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1973).
142. Id. at 310.
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the contract from ever coming into existence."'143 With this distinc-
tion, "the policy is a perfectly good policy and completely incontestable
.. [but it does not and never did cover the particular casualty on
which the plaintiff is suing."'144
Other states have limited the use of a first manifest type of defense
based solely on the language of the incontestable clause. In Taylor v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,145 a trial court dismissed an in-
sured's suit as a matter of law after an agreed statement of facts dis-
closed misrepresentations. On appeal to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, the primary issue before the court was whether the
insurer was required to show an intent to deceive.
The statutorily phrased incontestable clause in the policy provided
that
(a) After two years from the date of issue of this policy no misstatements, ex-
cept fraudulent misstatements, made by the applicant in the application for
such policy shall be used to void the policy or to deny a claim for loss incurred
or disability... commencing after the expiration of such two year period. (b)
No claim for loss incurred or disability... commencing after two years from
the date of issue of this policy shall be reduced or denied on the ground that a
disease or physical condition had existed prior to the effective date of coverage
under this policy unless, effective on the date of loss, such disease or physical
condition was excluded from coverage by name or specific description.' 4
6
Interpreting clause (a), the court held that for any disability com-
mencing after two years, proof of intent to deceive was required, but
only for disability or loss that commenced after two years. The court
reached that conclusion by applying the portion of the clause stating
that it applied to loss "commencing after the expiration of 'two years
from the date of issue of this policy.'"14 7 For loss or disability com-
mencing within two years, however, the court held that the clause had
no application. "Hence the defendant may raise after that period the
defense of a non-fraudulent misstatement in the application against a
143. Id. at 313.
144. Id. at 315 (quoting 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 912 (3d ed. 1963)). The case also relied on older first
manifest law from a number of jurisdictions, as well as treatises, in concluding
that the first manifest argument was not barred by disability. See, e.g., Pekras v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 10 N.E.2d 704,706 (Il. App. Ct. 1937); Palumbo v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 199 N.E. 335,336 (Mass. 1935); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Hicks, 183 N.E. 93, 95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Elias, 109
P.2d 815 (Okla. 1941); Guise v. New York Life Ins. Co., 191 A. 626 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1937); 18 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 72:101 (2d ed. 1968). See generally
V.G. Lewter, Annotation, Construction of Incontestable Clause Applicable to Disa-
bility Insurance, 13 A.L.R.3d 1383 (1968). The majority of incontestability stat-
utes are patterned on a model NAIC statute drafted in 1946. See Fosaaen, supra
note 30, at 270. Cases predating 1946 will arise under a differing version of the
statute, but will remain authority for interpretation of a newer version.
145. 214 A.2d 109, 115-16 (N.H. 1965).
146. Id. at 114.
147. Id. at 115.
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claim for loss incurred or a disability commencing before such two
year period of limitation has arrived."'148 Similarly, the court held
that "paragraph (b) would not bar the insurer from raising, after two
years from the date of issue, the defense of pre-existing disease or
physical condition as to a loss incurred or a disability commencing
within two years from the date of issue of the policy."1 4 9
Still other courts have rejected the doctrine based on policy consid-
erations. Oglesby v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co.150 involved an
insurer who raised the defense in a less than ideal situation. In
Oglesby, Delaware law allowed an alternate version of the statute,
which stated that "[a]fter this policy has been in force for a period of 2
years during the lifetime of the insured (excluding any period during
which the insured is disabled), it shall become incontestable as to any
statements, other than fraudulent statements, contained in the appli-
cation."151 The statute also allowed the insurer to deviate in a fashion
more favorable to the insured.152 In this case, Penn Mutual deviated
from the statute by deleting the portion of the clause dealing with
fraudulent misrepresentations. The policy also contained language
excluding preexisting conditions and defining sickness as sickness
that "first makes itself known while this policy is in force." 153
Oglesby concealed a degenerative cervical arthritis. Five years af-
ter the issuance of the policy, he filed a claim for disability due to cer-
vical arthritis.15 4 Penn Mutual attempted to rescind the policy and
subsequent upgrades.
At a final pretrial conference, Penn Mutual asserted for the first
time a first manifest defense. The plaintiff moved for a summary
judgment excluding the defense, and the court granted the motion.
"Despite its lachrymose cries... Penn Mutual took a calculated risk
by... opting for a more lenient, and thus more marketable version of
the incontestability clause. Courts are not in the habit of relieving
parties, especially sophisticated insurance companies, of their improv-
ident decisions."'15 5
Oglesby may be an interesting example of a court placing a higher
value on C(o). The combination of the late assertion of the defense and
148. Id.
149. Id. at 116.
150. 889 F. Supp. 770 (D. Del. 1995), aff'd, 127 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1997)(Table No. 95-
7596).
151. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3306(c) (1996).
152. Id. § 3304(a).
153. Oglesby v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 770, 775 (D. Del. 1995).
154. Id. at 772.
155. Id. at 778-79. The court also relied heavily on giving the language in the policy
its "ordinary and usual meaning." Id. at 777. The holding in Oglesby was con-
firmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in a certified question. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146 (Del. 1997).
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the voluntary deviation from the statute tipped the equities away
from the insurer and may have appeared as overreaching.
Several cases interpreting Indiana law have also reached the same
response. In Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. ,156 the in-
sured concealed his medical history and misrepresented his financial
condition. The clause contained language identical to the Haas
clause,157 except for a plain language beginning, which stated that
"[a]fter Your Policy has been in force for two years, excluding any time
You are Disabled, We cannot contest the statements in the
application."'SS
The court cited three policy reasons in favor of the clause, first not-
ing that the clauses were enacted to "promote certainty and reduce
litigation."'159 In addition, the clauses prevent "an insurer from lull-
ing the insured, by inaction, into fancied security during the time
when the facts could best be ascertained and proved, only to litigate
them belatedly, possibly after the death of the insured."160
After noting policy reasons behind the passage of the clause, the
court rejected the first manifest defense.
By use of this precise language, the legislature struck a balance. The clause
protects an insured who is healthy enough to work throughout the two-year
period from losing the security of disability insurance because of some prior
condition that might eventually disable him. On the other hand, the insurer
is protected in that it is not precluded from denying benefits to an applicant
whose pre-existing condition is so bad that he becomes disabled during the
two-year period. 16 1
156. 725 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
157. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
158. Wischemeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 998 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
159. Id. at 1000.
160. Id. This policy concern was a factor in New York cases that reject the doctrine.
In White v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 465 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983), the court rejected the doctrine, stating that "the legislative intent be-
hind the clause is to safeguard an insured from excessive litigation many years
after a policy has already been in force and to assure him security in financial
planning for his family, while providing the insurer a reasonable opportunity to
investigate." Id. at 346. See also Fischer v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 458 F.
Supp. 939, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(stating that the purpose of the incontestability
clause is to "encourage insurance buyers to purchase insurance with confidence
that after the contestable period has passed they are assured of receiving bene-
fits"); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 512 N.Y.S.2d 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)(fol-
lowing White v. Massachusetts, 465 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), and
specifically rejecting Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d
425 (5th Cir. 1975)). But see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hayden, 386 N.Y.S.2d 978,
981-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), afld, 401 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)(folow-
ing Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.
1975), and recognizing the exist/manifest distinction).
161. Wischemeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 1001-02 (S.D. Ind.
1989).
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The court also rejected the reasoning later used by the Haas court
that the limitation as to preexisting conditions was an exclusion by
specific description. "[Sluch a provision would be absurd, for all insur-
ers would instantly place such a statement in their form policies, and
thereafter no insurer would be precluded from denying claims based
on pre-existing conditions."' 6 2
The Northern District of Indiana reached a similar result in 1983,
in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bell.163 In Bell, the insured was
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1978, missing four months of
work. In 1980, Bell took out an occupational disability policy, failing
to mention either his conditions or several hospitalizations.164 The
policy contained both a standard incontestability clause and an exclu-
sion for preexisting conditions.' 6 5
Initially, the court simplified the clause by impliedly rejecting the
argument later used in Haas that the preexisting clause operated as
an exclusion by specific description. "[M]ultiple sclerosis was not a
condition excluded from coverage by name or specific description."166
The court also rejected construction of the clause to protect only condi-
tions that had not manifested. "Such an interpretation would contro-
vert the statutorily imposed incontestability clause, and reduce its
protection below that which was mandated by the legislature."' 67
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Focusing on the language of the
clause, the court held that
the term 'exist" in its ordinary sense refers broadly to a state of being, without
reservation as to other qualities, including manifestation.... To insert into
162. Id. at 1005. The reasoning is flawed. First, the reasoning ignores that insurers
would be allowed to deny claims only for those conditions that have manifested,
allowing the innocent insured to be protected. An early Oklahoma court de-
scribed the absurdity inherent in the Wischmeyer holding.
It seems to us illogical to say that a company will issue a policy of insur-
ance wherein it is expressly stated that it will give certain benefits upon
the happening of a clearly defined future event, and to further say.., it
thereby agrees to deny itself the right to ask whether the clearly defined
future event has happened. We are asked to hold that the incontestabil-
ity clause has the effect of making the company say: we assume certain
stated coverages for a period of two years, and coverages without limit
thereafter.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Elias, 109 P.2d 815, 817 (Okla. 1941). Second, insurers
themselves advocate use of the doctrine only in narrow circumstances, as is evi-
denced by commentary at the International Claims Association. "It is important
that the Forman defense be used correctly, appropriately and when warranted by
the facts." Ralph Olsen, First Manifest, 1991 Irr'L CLAIMS AsS'N INDIVIDUAL
HEALTH INS. WORKSHOP REP. 120, 123. The industry recognizes that if the doc-
trine is not used appropriately, courts will restrict its use. Id.
163. 818 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ind. 1993), affd, 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994).
164. Id. at 246.
165. Id. at 247.
166. Id. at 250.
167. Id. at 251.
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the clause a limitation to a disease or condition which existed but did not
manifest prior to the effective date of the policy would be to evade the man-
date of the legislature, and that we cannot sustain.
168
Additionally, the court noted that Equitable Life could have
worded the clause so as to exclude fraudulent misstatements. The
court recognized that "t]here may be a price for such a rule, in the
form of higher premiums and more extensive intrusions on the privacy
of applicants as insurers go to greater lengths to expose any ailments
that might have been concealed. But that is a balance that the legisla-
ture has struck."'16 9
The doctrine also was rejected in Insurance Commissioner v. Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co.170 The Mutual Life case arose in an unusual
procedural context. Holland, a Mutual Life (MONY) insured, applied
for a disability policy in November 1985. She disclosed an ulcer, and a
rider for gastrointestinal disorders was added to her policy.' 7 1 Four
years later, Holland filed a claim for disability due to anxiety and
panic attacks. Investigation disclosed a history of panic attacks and
anxiety beginning in 1984.172 MONY denied the claim based on the
language defining sickness as "sickness or disease which first
manifests itself while the Policy is in force."17 3 Holland complained to
the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA), which found that the
claim denial was in contravention of state law. i 74 MONY appealed
first to the Insurance Commissioner, who upheld MIA's determina-
tion, and then to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
The Court of Special Appeals reviewed the determination on what
is essentially an arbitrary and capricious standard.175 Even under
this standard, however, it is clear that the court felt legislatively
bound to reject the first manifest doctrine. After reviewing a number
of cases, including Wischmeyer, Ogelsby, Haas, and Forman, the court
adopted the minority rule.17 6
168. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Bell, 27 F.3d 1274, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1994).
169. Id. at 1283. For student commentary supporting the holding in Bell, see Alexan-
der B. Temel, Comment, Incontestability Statute Nullifies Contract Language:
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bell, 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994), 47 WASH.
U. J. URB. & Collop. L. 271 (1995).
170. 680 A.2d 584 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996), cert. granted, 685 A.2d 450 (Md. 1996).
171. Id. at 586-87.
172. Id. at 588 n.9.
173. Id. at 587.
174. Id. at 588.
175. Id. at 590. The reviewing court can modify a determination of the Commissioner
when the determination is (1) in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in ex-
cess of the Commissioner's statutory authority or jurisdiction; (3) made on unlaw-
ful procedure; (4) affected by error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence; or (6) is arbitrary and capricious. Id.
176. The Mutual Life court described it as a "substantial minority." Id. at 596. The
Ogelsby court described it as a "growing minority." Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
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[W]e feel that a reasonable person reading this clause, or its equivalent in
§ 441(2), and giving the terms their ordinary meanings would conclude that,
after the expiration of the incontestability period, no disability claim that was
not specifically excluded by name or specific description, commencing two
years after the policy's inception could be denied on the ground that the un-
derlying disease or condition existed before the policy became effective, re-
gardless of whether it manifested itself prior to the policy date. 1 7 7
Two Michigan cases reached an opposite result on the doctrine.
The differing results show that courts have applied the doctrine in a
fact-specific manner with concern for the equities involved. In Weiner
v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co.,178 the insured was told in 1985 that
she might have optical neuritis, which was likely, but not definitely
the result of multiple sclerosis (MS). Her policy of disability insurance
became effective one month later.17 9 The policy contained a standard
incontestability clause and an exclusion for preexisting conditions.
The insured filed a claim for disability from MS in 1988.
In opposition to the result reached in Bell, the court held that it
would be rewriting the clause if it did not follow the Revere
interpretation.
[Tihere is nothing ambiguous as to the language of M.C.LA. § 500.3408(b),
the statutorily mandated incontestability clause. It only estops an insurer
from denying coverage on the ground that a disease existed prior to the issu-
ance of the policy. M.C.L.A. § 500.3408(b) contains no language implying that
an insurer may not deny coverage if a disease manifested itself, as well as
existed, prior to the policy's issuance.... [Tihe Court under Michigan law
does not have the power to add new meaning to the incontestability clause.1 8 0
A different judge on the same court reached a different conclusion
in Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Altman.181 In Altman,
the insured was told in 1986 that a chronic uveitis could lead to loss of
vision. He was issued a disability policy after failing to disclose the
condition.182 In 1991, the insured suffered a vitreous hemorrhage and
filed a claim for disability benefits. Medical testimony conflicted as to
whether the chronic uveitis caused the hemorrhage.18 3
Altman's policy contained a nonstandard incontestability clause
that had been modified by deleting a fraudulent misstatement excep-
tion. At oral argument, the insurer admitted that the policy had been
Oglesby, 889 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D. Del. 1995), affd, 127 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir.
1997)(Table No. 95-7596).
177. Insurance Comm'r v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 680 A.2d 584, 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995).
178. No. 90-72772, 1991 WL 353370 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1991).
179. Id. at *1.
180. Id. at *2. The court, while agreeing with Revere's interpretation of the clause,
denied summary judgment due to the factual issue of whether the disease had
manifested prior to the issuance of the policy. Id. at *3.
181. 795 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
182. Id. at 217-18.
183. Id. at 220.
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modified to make it "more marketable."' 8 4 Based on this, the court
concluded that the insurer had "contracted not to contest statements
in the application, even if those statements were fraudulently
made.... [Ilt cannot have this court now include in the policy either
the specific language or the public policy behind the language."' 8 5
The differing results can be explained in terms of two factors-the
more attenuated link between the concealed condition and cause of
loss, and the modification of policy language for marketing reasons in
Altman. Again, this may have impliedly raised the value of C(o) by
creating the impression of overreaching.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the area of first manifest, courts grapple with a difficult issue
overlaid with significant policy concerns. This Article suggests that
the policy concerns that favored incontestability have now been con-
trolled by other developments in the law, while those favoring limited
exceptions to incontestability have become far more prominent.
This theoretical analysis does not exist in a vacuum. The potential
impact of fraud in the disability area is enormous. An estimated 48.8
million Americans meet one broad, nonoccupational definition of disa-
bility.186 Disability costs account for as much as 10% of employer's
payrolls.' 8 7 "[D]isability claims, in pure numbers, have risen dramat-
ically over the past few years."'ss Diagnoses that are difficult to test
objectively, or for which severity is difficult to measure, account for a
large component of the increase. Disability claims for chronic fatigue
syndrome increased 800% industrywide from 1988 to 1994, while
claims for carpal tunnel syndrome increased 520%.189
In Haas, the court implicitly used economic analysis to alter the
rule of law and promote economic efficiency. Beyond this, the rule pro-
motes justice between the parties.
184. Id. at 222.
185. Id. The court went on to indicate that it would have reached a different result
even had it agreed with the interpretation advanced by the insurer. "[Sluch a
reading would render the contract ambiguous.... [Tihus, the court will construe
such ambiguity in favor of the insured." Id. at 223.
186. Background Check: Americans With Disabilities Act, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July
26, 1995, at A12.
187. John Wiggin, Managing Disability To the Client's Benefit, BEsTs REV., Nov. 1993,
at 73.
188. Bernstein, supra note 59, at 40.
189. Jacalyn Reinberg & Nora K. Lewis, Subjective Claim Templates: Dynamics of
Disability: Marketing, Risk & Financial Management Seminar, Presentation at
JHA Seminar 4 (Feb. 16, 1994)(on file with Author).
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